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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK M. WELLS, Assignee, 
Statutory Assignment for the 
Benefit of Creditors of Financial 
Service Company, Inc., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; and FRIST 
SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, a National 
Assocaition, 
Defendants and Appellant, 
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a Utah banking corporation, 
vs. 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
GOLDEN STETTLER, an individual, 
LYNN TOOLSON, an individual, 
ALMA DITTMER, an individual, 
H. M. NIELSON, an individual, 
and ELMER GIBSON, an individual, 
Third-Party Defendants 
and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 15750 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
To the statement in the Appellant's Brief, Respondents add 
that neither the Plaintiff nor the Third-Party Plaintiff has 
seen fit to add Elmer G. Erickson as a Party Defendant, even 
though all of the allegations of the Complaint and the Third-
Party Complaint complain of acts by Elmer G. Erickson. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Since no evidence was taken, the "Statement of Facts• can 
be nothing more than references to the pleadings. Appellant's 
Statement of facts differs from the pleadings wherein it states: 
"While so employed and in the scope of his employment, Elmer G. 
Erickson perpetrated those acts ..• " (Brief p. 4). There is no 
allegation in the pleadings that in doing the acts complained of, 
Elmer G. Erickson was acting within the scope and authority of 
his employment. The only reference is in Paragraph (21) of the 
Third-Party Complaint which states: "Those actions being done 
while Elmer G. Erickson was an agent or servant of Third-Party 
Defendants in the course of his work as an agent or servant ... " 
(R. 45) 
It should be noted also, that there is no allegation that 
Respondents had any prior knowledge of any criminal tendencies or 
conduct of Elmer G. Erickson, but only the general allegation 
that Respondents were "negligent in hiring" Elmer G. Erickson. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I 
A PRINCIPAL OR MASTER IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE FORGERY, 
ALTERATION OR COMPLETION OF CHECKS BY AN AGENT OR EMPLOYEE. 
Appellants have not mentioned, nor have they cited any author· 
ity for the real issue in this action; i,e., whether a principal 
or master is liable for an agent or servant's forgery, alteration 
or wrongful completion of cl. ;cks. 
-2-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"A principal will not be liable, ordinarily, for the agent's 
for~eries or unauthorized alterations or completions of instru-
ments ... This is based on the very obvious principle that any 
unauthorized change in a material respect destroys the integrity 
of the instrument as the contract which the maker has executed. 
It ceases to be his contract and is avoided, even the hands of 
an innocent holder for value." 3 Am. Jur. 2d 630,631. Walsh 
vs. Hunt, 120 Cal. 46; 52 Pac. ll5. 
An alteration of an instrument by an agent of a party 
thereto or of one claiming thereunder is in legal effect, the 
act of the principal if such alteration is within the express or 
implied authority of the agent; otherwise it is to be regarded 
as the act of a stranger, constituting a mere spoliation unless 
subsequently ratified. 4 Am. Jur. 2d 16. 
There is no allegation in the Complaint or the Third-Party 
Complaint that any forgeries, alterations or completions of 
instruments committed by Elmer G. Erickson were done with 
express or implied from the principal. On the contrary, all of 
the acts are treated as without authority and wrongful. 
Further, it is clear that an employer may not be held 
liable for the criminal acts of an employee on the theory that 
the employer ought to have forseen or anticipated that the 
employee would commit the criminal act and provided against the 
possibility of its commission. Belmar Inc. vs. Dixie Building 
Maintenance, Inc., 226 So. 2d 280, 53 Am. Jur. 2d 463. 
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II 
A PRINCIPAL OR MASTER IS LIABLE FOR THE TORT OF AN AGENT 
OR EMPLOYEE ONLY WHEN THE TORT IS PERFORMED WITHIN THE 
SCOPE OF THE AGENT'S AUTHORITY AND EMPLOYMENT AND WITH 
INTENT TO FURTHER THE EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS. 
The well-settled rule i~ that a principal is liable civilly 
for the tortious acts of his agent which are done within the 
course and scope of the agent's employment. 
No person dealing with an agent may hold the principal 
liable for any act or transaction of the agent not within the 
scope of his real or apparent authority. For all such unauthor-
ized acts, the agent, and he alone, may be held liable. 
3 Am. Jur. 2d 628. Kasner vs. Gage 281 Minn. 149, 161 N.W. 2d 40. 
The foregoing is especially sigificant since all of the alle-
gations of the Complaint in the instant action characterize 
Elmer G. Erickson's acts as "unauthorized acts" and these 
allegations are referred to and incorporated in the Appellant's 
Third-Party Complaint and in the Appellant's Brief. 
There is no distinction to be drawn between the liability 
of a principal for the tortious act of his agent and the lia-
bility of a master for the tortious act of his servent. In bo~ 
cases the liability is based on the master and servant rather 
than any agency principle; the liability for the tortious act of 
the employee is grounded upon the maxim of respondeat superior 
and is to be determined by considering from a factual standpoint 
the question whether the tortiuos act was done while the em-
ployee, whether agent or servant, was acting within the scope of 
-4-
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his employment. 3 Am. Jur. 2d 632. 
If it is to be concluded that the employee was not acting 
pursuant to the employer's authorization, or within the scope of 
his employment, the Defendant employer may not be held liable. 
The employer may not be held liable for his employees willful 
misconduct even though done in the course of his employment, if 
it is not within the scope of his employment or in furtherance 
of the employer's business. 53 Am. Jur. 2d 457, Sandman vs. 
Hagan, 154 N.W. 2d 113. 
A principal is not legally responsible for an agent's 
conduct when the agent performs an act within the general scope 
of his employment but with no intention to further the interests 
of the principal. NLRB vs. International Longshoremen's and 
Warehousemen's Union, 283 F 2d 58 (1960). There is no alle-
gation that Respondents or the Trust profited from Erickson's 
conduct. 
III 
A MERE ALLEGATION OF "NEGLIGENCE IN HIRING" IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO STATE A CLAIM FOR LIABILITY OF A PRINCIPAL OR MASTER 
FOR CRIMINAL ACTS OF AN AGENT OR EMPLOYEE. 
There is a line of cases holding that a principal may be 
liable on negligence theory for an employee's tortious conduct 
if the principal has prior knowledge of the employee's criminal 
record. 48 ALR 3d 359, Abraham vs. Onorato Garages, 50 Haw. 
628,639,446 pd 821 (1968). In the instant case, there is no 
allegation of prior knowledge of criminal conduct or even of a 
-5-
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propensity for criminal conduct. The allegation that Respondents 
were "negligent in hiring" Elmer G. Erickson is in and of itself 
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Even in the cases cited by Appellants, an essential element 
of the Complaint was that the Defendant "knew or had knowledge 
that an employee had played dangerous pranks to those properly 
on the premises of the Defendant." (App. Brief 14) 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Third-Party 
Complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. The cases cited in Appellant's Brief are not in point, 
but are only statements of general law which are not pertinant 
to forgery and alteration of negotiable instruments. 
[/. 
DATED this ~ day of June, 1978. 
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W. Scott Barrett 
300 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this, the /& ,/J- day of June, 
1978, I served two copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
on the following persons by mail, postage prepaid: 
Calvin L. Rampton and 
D. Miles Holman 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Walker Bank & Trust 
Company 
800 Walker Bank Building Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 
N. George Daines, III 
DAINES & DAINES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
128 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Don B. Allen 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant First Security Bank 
Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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